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Abstract. We consider a random financial network with a large number
of agents. The agents connect through credit instruments borrowed from
each other or through direct lending, and these create the liabilities. The
settlement of the debts of various agents at the end of the contract period
can be expressed as solutions of random fixed point equations. Our first
step is to derive these solutions (asymptotically), using a recent result on
random fixed point equations. We consider a large population in which
the agents adapt one of the two available strategies, risky or risk-free in-
vestments, with an aim to maximize their expected returns (or surplus).
We aim to study the emerging strategies when different types of replica-
tor dynamics capture inter-agent interactions. We theoretically reduced
the analysis of the complex system to that of an appropriate ordinary
differential equation (ODE). We proved that the equilibrium strategies
converge almost surely to that of an attractor of the ODE. We also de-
rived the conditions under which a mixed evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) emerges; in these scenarios the replicator dynamics converges to
an equilibrium at which the expected returns of both the populations are
equal. Further the average dynamics (choices based on large observation
sample) always averts systemic risk events (events with large fraction of
defaults). We verified through Monte Carlo simulations that the equilib-
rium suggested by the ODE method indeed represents the limit of the
dynamics.
Keywords: Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), Replicator dynamics,
Ordinary differential equation, Random graph, Systemic risk, Financial
network.
1 Introduction
We consider a financial network with large number of agents. These agents are
interconnected to each other through financial commitments (e.g., borrowing -
lending etc.). In addition they make investments in either risk-free (risk neutral)
or risky derivatives. In such a system the agents not only face random economic
shocks (received via significantly smaller returns of their risky investments),
they are also affected by the percolation of the shocks faced by their neighbours
(creditors), neighbours of their neighbours etc. In the recent years from 2007−
2008 onwards, there is a surge of activity to study the financial and systemic
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level risks caused by such a percolation of shocks ([6,5,4,1]). Systemic risk is
the study of the risks related to financial networks, when individual or entity
level shocks can trigger severe instability at system level that can collapse the
entire economy (e.g., [6,5,4]). In this set of papers, the author study the kind
of topology (or graph structure) that is more stable towards the percolation of
shocks in financial network, where stability is measured in terms of the total
number of defaults in the network.
In contrast to many existing studies in literature related to systemic risk, we
consider heterogeneous agents and we consider evolutionary framework. In our
consideration, there are two groups of agents existing simultaneously in the net-
work; one group of agents invest in risk-free instruments, while the other group
considers risky investments. The second group borrows money from the other
members of the network to gather more funds towards the risky investments
(with much higher expected returns). These investments are subjected to large
(but rare) economic shocks, which can potentially percolate throughout the net-
work and can even affect the ‘risk-free’ agents; the extent of percolation depends
upon relative sizes of the two groups. We consider that new agents join such a
network after each round of investment; they chose their investment type (risky
or risk-free) based on their observations of the returns (the surplus of the agents
after paying back their liabilities) of a random sample of agents that invested
in previous round. The relative sizes of the two groups changes, the network
structure changes, which influences the (economic shock-influenced) returns of
the agents in the next round, which in turn influences the decision of the new
agents for the round after. Thus the system evolves after each round. We study
this evolution process using the well known evolutionary game theoretic tools.
In a financial network perspective, this type of work is new to the best of
our knowledge. We found few papers that consider evolutionary approach in
other aspects related to finance; in [8], the authors study the financial safety net
(a series of the arrangement of the firms to maintain financial stability), and
analyze the evolution of the bank strategies (to take insurance or not); recently
in [7] authors consider an evolutionary game theoretic model with three types
of players, i) momentum traders ii) contrarian traders iii) fundamentalists and
studied the evolution of the relative populations. As already mentioned, these
papers relate to very different aspects in comparison with our work.
Evolutionary stable strategies Traditionally evolutionary game models have
been studied in the literature to study animal behaviour. The key ingredients of
the evolutionary game models are a) a large number of players, b)the dynam-
ics and c) the pay-off function (e.g., see the pioneering work [13]). Replicator
dynamics deals with evolution of strategies, reward based learning in dynamic
evolutionary games. Typically it is shown that these dynamics converge to a sta-
ble equilibrium point called Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), which can be
seen as a refinement of a strict Nash Equilibrium ([13]); a strategy prevailing in
a large population is called evolutionary stable if any small fraction of mutants
playing a different strategy get wiped out eventually. Formally, in a 2-player
symmetric game, a pure strategy sˆ is said to be evolutionary stable if
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1. (sˆ, sˆ) is a Nash Equilibrium; i.e., u(sˆ, sˆ) ≥ u(s′ , sˆ) ∀s′ and
2. If (sˆ, sˆ) is not a strict NE (i.e., ∃ some s′ 6= sˆ such that u(sˆ, sˆ) = u(s′ , sˆ)),
then u(sˆ, s
′
) > u(s
′
, s
′
).
We study the possible emergence of evolutionary stable strategies, when peo-
ple chose either a risky or a risk-free strategy; the main difference being that the
returns of either group are influenced by the percolation of shocks. The returns
of the portfolios depend further upon the percolation of shocks due to layered
structure of financial connections, and not just on the returns of the investments,
i.e., not just on economic shocks. Our main conclusions are two fold; a) when
agents consider large sample of data for observation and learning, the replicator
dynamics can settle to a mixed ESS, at which the expected returns of the two
the groups are balanced; b) in many other scenarios, through theoretical as well
as simulation based study, we observed that the replicator dynamics converges
to one of the two strategies, i.e., to a pure ESS (after completely wiping out the
other group).
The analysis of these complex networks (in each round) necessitated the study
of random fixed point equations (defined sample path-wise in large dimensional
spaces), which represent the clearing vectors of all the agents ([1,6,5,4] etc). The
study is made possible because of the recent result in [1], which provided an
asymptotically accurate one dimensional equivalent solution.
2 Large Population Finance Network
We consider random graphs, where the edges represent the financial connection
between the two nodes. Any two nodes are connected with probability pss > 0
independent of the others, but the weights on the edges depend on (the number
of) neighbors. This graph represents a large financial network where borrowing
and lending are represented by the edges and the weights over them. The mod-
eller may not have access to the exact connections of the network, but random
graph model is a good approach to analyse such a complex system. In particular
we consider the graphs that satisfy the assumptions of [1].
The agents are repeatedly investing in some financial projects. In each round
of investment, the agents borrow/lend to/from some random subset of the agents
of the network. Some of them may invest the remaining in a risk-free investment
(which has a constant rate of interest rs). While the others invest the rest of
their money in risky investments which have random returns; we consider a
binomial model in which returns are high (rate u) with high probability δ and
can have large shocks (rate d), but with small probability (1− δ); it is clear that
d < rs < u. We thus have two types of agents, we call the group that invests
in risk-free projects as ‘risk-free’ group (G1), the rest are being referred to as
‘risky’ group (G2)
New agents join the network in each round of investment. They chose their
investment type, either risk-free or risky, for the first time based on the previous
experience of the network and continue the same choice for all future rounds of
investment. The new agents learn from network experience (returns of agents of
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the previous round of investments) and chose a suitable investment type, that
can potentially give them good returns. The new agents either learn from the
experience of a random sample (returns of two random agents) of the network or
learn from a large number of agents. In the former case, their choice of investment
type depends upon the returns of the random sample in the previous round.
While in the latter case the decision can also depend on the average utility of
each group of the agents, obtained after observing large number of samples.
Two strategies: As mentioned before, there are two strategies available in
the financial market. Risk-free agents of G1 use strategy 1; these agents lend
some amount of their initial wealth to other agents (of G2) that are willing to
borrow, while the rest is invested in a government security, for example, bonds,
government project etc. Risky agents of G2 are adapting strategy 2, wherein they
borrow funds from the other agents and invest in risky security, for example,
derivative markets, stocks, corporate loans etc.. These agents also lend to other
agents of G2. Let t be the fraction of the agents in G1 group and let n(t) be
the total number of agents in round t. Thus the total number of agents (during
round t) in group 1 equals n1(t) := |G1| = n(t)t and n2(t) := |G2| = n(t)(1−t).
We consider that one new agent is added in each round 1, and thus size of
the graph/network is increasing. The agents are homogeneous, i.e., they reserve
the same wealth w > 0 for investments (at the initial investment period) of each
round. Each round is composed of two time periods, the agents invest during the
initial investment period and they obtain their returns after some given time gap.
The two time period model is borrowed from [5,4,1] etc. The new agents make
their choice for the next (and the future) round(s), based on their observations
of these returns of the previous round.
Initial investment phases: During the initial investment phases (of any
round t), any agent i ∈ G1 lends to any agent j ∈ G2 with probability pss and
it lends (same) amount2 w/(n(t)pss) to each of the approachers based on the
number that approached it for loan; let Iij be the indicator of this lending event.
Note that for large n(t), the number of approachers of G2 approximately equals
n(t)(1− t)pss, and, thus any agent of G1 lends approximately w(1− t) fraction
to agents of G2. The agents of G1 invest the rest wt in risk-free investment
(returns with fixed rate of interest rs).
Let w˜ be the accumulated wealth3 of any agent of G2 out of which a positive
fraction α is invested towards the other banks of G2 and (1 − α) portion is
invested in risky security. Thus the accumulated wealth of a typical G2 agent is
governed by the following equation,
w˜ = w + w︸ ︷︷ ︸
Initial wealth + Borrowed from G1
+ w˜α︸︷︷︸
Lend/borrow G2
and thus w˜ =
w(1 + )
(1− α) . (1)
1 this approach can easily be generalized to several other types of dynamics and we
briefly discuss a few of them towards the end.
2 This normalization, (after choosing the required parameters, like w, appropriately)
is done to derive simpler final expressions.
3 These amounts could be random and different from agent to agent, but with large
networks (by law of large numbers) one can approximate these to be constants.
Financial replicator dynamics: emergence of systemic-risk-averting strategies 5
Thus the total investment towards the risky venture equals w˜(1−α) = w(1 + ).
The G2 agents have to settle their liabilities at the end of the return/contract
period (in each round) and this would depend upon their returns from the risky
investments. Thus the total liability of any agent of G2 is y = (w+ w˜α)(1 + rb),
where rb is the borrowing rate
4; by simplifying
y =
w(+ α)(1 + rb)
(1− α) .
Similarly, any agent of G2 lends the following amount to each of its approachers
(of G2):
αw˜
n(1− t)pss =
αw(1 + )
n(1− t)pss(1− α) . (2)
Fig. 1. Apportioning of G1
Fig. 2. Apportioning of G2
Return and Settling phases, Clearing Vectors: We fix the round t
and avoid notation t for simpler notations. The agents of G2 have to clear their
liabilities during this phase in every round. Recall the agents of G2 invested
w(1 + ) amount in risky-investments and the corresponding random returns
(after economic shocks) are:
Ki =
{
w(1 + )(1 + u) =: ku, w.p. (with probability) δ
w(1 + )(1 + d) =: kd, otherwise
(3)
This is the well known binomial model, in which the upward moment occurs
with probability δ and downward moment with (1−δ). The agents have to return
y (after the interest rate rb) amount to their creditors, however may not be able
to manage the same because of the above economic shocks. In case of default,
the agents return the maximum possible; let Xi be the amount cleared by the
ith agent of group G2. Here we consider a standard bankruptcy rule, limited
liability and pro-rata basis repayment of the debt contract (see [5,4]), where
the amounts returned are proportional to their liability ratios. Thus node j of
G2 pays back XiLji(1 + rb)/y towards node i, where Lji the amount borrowed
(liability) during initial investment phases equals (see the details of previous
subsection and equation (2)):
Lji =
{
Iji
w
npss
, if i ∈ G1
Iji
αw(1+)
npss(1−α)(1−) , if i ∈ G2.
(4)
4 For simplicity of explanation, we are considering constant terms to represent all these
quantities, in reality they would be i.i.d. quantities which are further independent
of other rounds and the asymptotic analysis would go through as in [1].
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Thus the maximum amount cleared by any agent j ∈ G2, Xj , is given by the following
fixed point equation in terms of the clearing vector {Xi}i∈G2 composed of clearing
values of all the agents (see [5,4] etc):
Xi = min
{(
Ki +
∑
j∈G2
Xj
Lji
y
− v
)+
, y
}
, (5)
with the following details: the term Ki is the return of the risky investment, the term∑
j∈G2 Xj Lji/y equals the claims form the other agents (those borrowed from agent
i) and v denotes the taxes to pay. In other words, agent i will pay back the (maximum
possible) amount Ki +
∑
j∈G2 Xj
Lji
y
− v in case of a default, and in the other event,
will exactly pay back the liability amount y.
Surplus of any agent is defined as the amount obtained from various investments,
after clearing all the liabilities. This represents the utility of the agent in the given
round. The surplus of the agent i ∈ G2:
R2i =
(
Ki +
∑
j∈G2
Xj
Lji
y
− v − y
)+
, (6)
while that of agent i ∈ G1 is given by:
R1i =
(
w(1 + rs) +
∑
j∈G2
Xj
Lji
y
− v
)+
. (7)
In the above, the first term is the return from the risk free investment. The second
term equals the returns or claims form G2 agents (whom they lent) and v denotes the
amount of taxes.
3 Asymptotic approximation of the large networks
We thus have dynamic graphs whose size increases with each round. In this section, we
obtain appropriate asymptotic analysis of these graphs/systems, with an aim to derive
the pay-off of each group after each round. Towards this, we derive the (approximate)
closed form expression of the equations (6) and (7), which are nothing but the per-agent
returns after the settlement of the liabilities.
The returns of the agents depend upon how other agents settle their liabilities to
their connections/creditors. Thus our first step is to derive the solution of the clearing
vector fixed point equations (5). Observe that the clearing vector {Xj}j∈G2 is the
solution of the vector-valued random fixed point equations (5) in n-dimensional space
(where n is the size of the network), defined sample-path wise.
Clearing vectors using results of [1]: Our financial framework can be analysed using
the results of [1], as the details of the model match5 the assumptions of the paper. By
[1, Theorem 1], the aggregate claims converge almost surely to constant values (as the
network size increases to infinity):
(claims of agents of G1),
∑
j∈G2
Xj
Lji
y
→ (1− α)(1− )
α+ 
x¯∞ a.s., and
(claims of agents of G2),
∑
j∈G2
Xj
Lji
y
→ α(1 + )
(α+ )
x¯∞ a.s.,
5 Observe that α(1 + )/(α+ ) < 1.
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where the common expected clearing value x¯∞ satisfies the following fixed point equa-
tion in one-dimension:
x¯∞ = E
(
min
{
Ki +
α(1 + )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v, y
})+
. (8)
Further by the same Theorem, the clearing vectors converge almost surely to (asymp-
totically independent) random vectors:
Xi →
(
min
{
Ki +
α(1 + )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v, y
})+
, for each i ∈ G2. (9)
By virtue of the above results, the random returns given by equations (6) and (7),
converge almost surely:
R1i →
(
w(1 + rs) +
(1− α)(1− )
(α+ )
x¯∞ − v
)+
, for each i ∈ G1 (10)
R2i →
(
Ki +
α(1 + )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v − y
)+
, for each i ∈ G2. (11)
Probability of Default is defined as the fraction of agents of G2 that failed to pay back
their full liability, i.e., Pd := P (Xi < y). For large networks (when the initial network
size n0 itself is sufficiently large), one can use the above approximate expressions and
using the same we obtain the default probabilities and the aggregate clearing vectors
in the following (proof in Appendix).
Lemma 1. The asymptotic average clearing vector and the default probability of G2
is given by :
(x¯∞, Pd) =

(y, 0) if c >
y−w
y(
δy+(1−δ)w
1−(1−δ)c , 1− δ
)
if y−w
y−(1−δ)(w−w) < c <
y−w
y(
kd(1−δ)+kuδ
1−c , 1
)
if c <
y−w
y−(1−δ)(w−w)
(12)
where, c =
α+α
α+
, E(W ) = δku + (1− δ)kd , w = kd − v and w = ku − v. 
Expected Surplus: By virtue of the Theorem developed in [1, Theorem 1] we have a
significantly simplified limit system, whose performance is derived in the above Lemma.
We observe that this approximation is sufficiently close (numerical simulations illustrate
good approximations), and assume the following as the pay-offs of each group after each
round of the investments:
φ1() := E(R
1
i ) =
(
w(1 + rs) +
(1− α)(1− )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v
)+
, for any agent of G1
φ2() := E(R
2
i ) = E
(
Ki +
(1 + )α
α+ 
x¯∞ − v − y
)+
, (13)
=
(
ku +
α(1 + )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v − y
)+
δ +
(
kd +
α(1 + )
α+ 
x¯∞ − v − y
)+
(1− δ),
for any agent of G2. Observe here that the aggregate limits are almost sure constants,
hence the expected surplus of all the agents of the same group are equal, while the
random returns of the same group are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed).
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4 Analysis of Replicator dynamics
In every round of investments, we have a new network that represents the liability struc-
ture of all the agents of that round formed by the investment choices of the agents, and,
in the previous two sections we computed the (asymptotically approximate) expected
returns/utilities of each agent of the network. As already mentioned in Section 2, new
agents join the network in each round, and chose their strategies depending upon their
observations of these expected returns of the previous round.
These kind of dynamics is well described in literature by name replicator dynamics
(e.g.,[12,7,2] etc). The main purpose of such a study is to derive asymptotic analysis and
answer some or all of the following questions: will the dynamics converge, i.e., would the
relative fractions of various populations settle as the number of rounds increase? will
some of the strategies disappear eventually? if more than one population type survives
what would be the asymptotic fractions? etc. These kind of analysis are common in
other types of networks (e.g., wireless networks (e.g., [12]), biological networks ([2])),
but are relatively less studied in the context of financial networks (e.g., [7]). We are
interested in knowing the asymptotic outcome of these kind of dynamics (if there exists
one) and study the influence of various network parameters on the outcome. We begin
with precise description of the two types of dynamics considered in this paper.
4.1 Average Dynamics
The new agent contacts two random (uniformly sampled) agents of the previous round.
If both the contacted agents belong to the same group, the new agent adapts the
strategy of that group. When it contacts agents from both the groups it investigates
more before making a choice; the new agent observes significant portion of the network,
in that, it obtains a good estimate of the average utility of agents belonging to both the
groups. It adapts the strategy of the group with maximum (estimated) average utility.
Say it observes the average of each group with an error that is normally distributed
with mean equal to the expected return of the group and variance proportional to
the size of the group, i.e., it observes (here N (0, σ2) is a zero mean Gaussian random
variable with variance σ2)
φˆi() = φi() +Ni with N1 ∼ N
(
0,
1
c¯
)
and N2 ∼ N
(
0,
1
c¯(1− )
)
,
for some c¯ large. Observe by this modeling that: the expected values of the observations
are given by (φ1(), φ2()) and are determined by the relative proportions of the two
populations, while the variance of any group reduces as its proportion increases to 1 and
increases as the proportion reduces to zero. We also assume that the estimation errors
{N1,N2} (conditioned on the relative fraction, ) corresponding to the two groups are
independent. Then the probability that the new agent chooses strategy 1 is given by
Prob(φˆ1()− φˆ2() > 0) = Prob(N2 −N1 ≤ φ1()− φ2()),
which by (conditional) independence of Gaussian random variables equals6
g() :=
∫ (φ1()−φ2())√c¯(1−)
−∞
e−x
2/2 dx√
2pi
. (14)
6 because 1

+ 1
1− =
1
(1−)
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Let (n1(t), n2(t)) respectively represent the sizes of G1 and G2 population after
round t and note that t =
n1(t)
n1(t)+n2(t)
. Then the system dynamics is given by the
following (g(·) given by (14)):
(n1(t+ 1), n2(t+ 1)) =
{(
n1(t) + 1, n2(t)
)
w.p. 2t + 2t(1− t)g(t)(
n1(t), n2(t) + 1
)
w.p. (1− t)2 + 2t(1− t)(1− g(t)).
(15)
It is clear that (with 0 and n0 representing the initial quantities),
t+1 =
n1(t+ 1)
t+ n0 + 1
=
(t+ n0)t + Yt+1
t+ n0 + 1
= t +
1
t+ n0 + 1
(Yt+1 − t) where
Yt+1 =
{
1 wp 2t + 2t(1− t)g(t)
0 wp (1− t)2 + 2t(1− t)(1− g(t)), for all t ≥ 1.
One can rewrite the update equations as
t+1 = t +
1
t+ n0 + 1
(h(t) +Mt+1) , with, Mt+1 := Yt+1 − t − h(t), where,
h() := E
[
Yt+1 − t|t = 
]
= (1− ) (2g()− 1) for any 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
and observe that (with Ft the natural filtration of the process till t)
E[Mt+1|Ft] = E[Mt+1|t] = 0 and E[M2t+1|Ft] ≤ C for some constant C <∞.
Further observe that 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 for all t and all sample paths.
Thus our algorithm satisfies assumptions7 A.1 to A.4 of [11] and hence we have using
[11, Theorem 2] that
Theorem 1 The sequence {t} generated by average dynamics (15) converges almost
surely (a.s.) to a (possibly sample path dependent) compact connected internally chain
transitive invariant set of ODE:
˙t = h(t).  (16)
The dynamics start with initial condition 0 ∈ (0, 1) and clearly would remain
inside the interval [0, 1], i.e., t ∈ [0, 1] for all t (and almost surely). Thus we consider
the invariant sets of ODE (16) within this interval for some interesting case studies in
the following (Proof in Appendix).
Corollary 1 Define r¯r := uδ + d(1 − δ). And assume w(1 + d) > v and observe that
u > rb ≥ rs > d. Assume 0 ∈ (0, 1). Given the rest of the parameters of the problem,
there exists a δ¯ < 1 (depends upon the instance of the problem) such that the following
statements are valid for all δ ≥ δ¯:
(a) If r¯r > rb > rs then φ2() > φ1() for all , and t → 0 almost surely.
(b) If φ1() > φ2() for all  then t → 1 almost surely.
7 The assumptions require that the process is defined for the entire real line. One can
easily achieve this by letting h() = 0 for all  /∈ [0, 1], which still ensures required
Lipschitz continuity and by extending Mt+1 = 0 for all t /∈ [0, 1].
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(c) When rb > r¯r > rs, and case (b) is negated there exists a unique zero 
∗ of the
equation φ1()− φ2() = 0 and
t → ∗ almost surely; further for δ ≈ 1, ∗ ≈ rb − r¯r
r¯r − rs . 
From (13) and Lemma 1, it is easy to verify that all the limit points are evolutionary
stable strategies (ESS). Thus the replicator dynamics either settles to a pure strategy
ESS or mixed ESS (in part (c) of the corollary), depending upon the parameters of
the network; after a large number of rounds, either the fraction of agents following one
of the strategies converges to one or zero or the system reaches a mixed ESS which
balances the expected returns of the two groups.
In many scenarios, the expected rate of return of the risky investments is much
higher than the rate of interest related to lending/borrowing, i.e., r¯r > rb. Further
the assumptions of the corollary are satisfied by more or less all the scenarios (due
to standard no-arbitrage assumptions) and because the shocks are usually rare (i.e.,
δ is close to 1). Hence by the above corollary, in majority of scenarios, the average
dynamics converges to a pure strategy with all ‘risky’ agents (i.e., t → 0). The group
G1 gets wiped out and almost all agents invest in risky ventures, as the expected rate
of returns is more even in spite of large economic shocks. One can observe a converse
or a mixed ESS when the magnitude of the shocks is large (d too small) or when the
shocks are too often to make r¯r < rb.
4.2 Random dynamics
When the new agent contacts two random agents of different groups, its choice depends
directly upon the returns of the two contacted agents. The rest of the details remain
the same as in average dynamics. In other words, the new agents observe less, their
investment choice is solely based on the (previous round) returns of the two contacted
agents. In this case the dynamics are governed by the following (see (10)-(11)):
(n1(t+ 1), n2(t+ 1)) =

(n1(t) + 1, n2(t)) wp 
2
t
(n1(t), n2(t) + 1) wp (1− t)2
(n1(t) +G(t), n2(t) + (1−G(t))) else, with
G(t) = 1{R1≥R2} (17)
= 1{(
w(1+rs)+
(1−α)(1−)
(α+)
x¯∞−v
)+≥(Ki+α(1+)α+ x¯∞−v−y)+},
where x¯∞ = x¯∞(t) is given by Lemma 1. Here we assume people prefer risk-free
strategy under equality, one can easily consider the other variants. Once again this can
be rewritten as
t+1 = t +
Zt+1 − t
t+ n0 + 1
with Zt+1 =

1 wp 2t
0 wp (1− t)2
G(t) else.
(18)
As in previous section the above algorithm satisfies assumptions8 A.1 to A.4 of [11]
and once again using [11, Theorem 2], we have:
8 In the current paper, we consider scenarios in which hR(·) is Lipschitz continuous,
basically under the conditions of Corollary 2.
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Theorem 2 The sequence {t} generated by average dynamics (17) converges almost
surely (a.s.) to a (possibly sample path dependent) compact connected internally chain
transitive invariant set of ODE:
˙(t) = hR((t)), hR() := E
[
Zt+1 − t|t = 
]
= (1− )(2E[G()]− 1).  (19)
One can derive the analysis of this dynamics in a similar way as in average dynamics,
however there is an important difference between the two dynamics; we can never have
random dynamics converges to an intermediate attractor, like the attractor in part (c)
of Corollary 1 (unique ∗ satisfying φ1 = φ2). This is because E[G] = P (R1() > R2())
equals 0, 1 − δ or 1 and never 1/2 (unless δ = 1/2, which is not a realistic case).
Nevertheless, we consider the invariant sets (corresponding to pure ESS) within [0, 1]
for some cases (Proof in Appendix):
Corollary 2 Assume 0 ∈ (0, 1). Given the rest of the parameters of the problem, there
exists a 1/2 < δ < 1 (depends upon the instance of the problem) such that the following
statements are valid:
(a) If E[G] = 0 for all  or 1− δ for all , then t → 0 almost surely.
(b) If E[G] = 1 for all , then t → 1 almost surely.
(c) When w(1 + d) > v and u > rb ≥ rs > d, there exists a δ¯ < 1 such that for all
δ ≥ δ¯, the default probability Pd ≤ (1− δ) and E[G] = 1− δ and this is true for all
. Hence by part (a), t → 0 almost surely. 
Remarks: Thus from part (c), under the conditions of Corollary 1, the random dy-
namics always converges to all ‘risky’ agents (pure ESS), while the average dynamics,
as given by Corollary 1, either converges to pure or mixed ESS further based on system
parameters (mainly various rates of return).
From this partial analysis (corollaries are for large enough δ) it appears that one can
never have mixed ESS with random dynamics, and this is a big contrast to the average
dynamics; when agents observe sparsely the network eventually settles to one of the two
strategies, and if they observe more samples there is a possibility of emergence of mixed
ESS that balances the two returns. We observe similar things, even for δ as small as
0.8 in numerical simulations (Table 4). We are keen to understand this aspect in more
details as a part of the future work.
To summarize we have a financial network which grows with new additions, in
which the new agents adapt one of the two available strategies based on the returns
of the agents that they observed/interacted with. Our asymptotic analysis of [1] was
instrumental in deriving these results. This is just an initial study of the topic. One
can think of other varieties of dynamics, some of which could be a part of our future
work. The existing agents may change their strategies depending upon their returns
and observations. The agents might leave the network if they have reduced returns
repeatedly. The network may adjust itself without new additions etc.
5 Numerical observations
We performed numerical simulations to validate our theory. We included Monte-Carlo
(MC) simulation based dynamics in which the clearing vectors are also computed by
directly solving the fixed point equations, for any given sample path of shocks. Our
theoretical observation well matches the MC based limits.
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In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we tabulated the limits of the average dynamics for various
scenarios, and the observations match the results of Corollary 1. The configuration
used for Table 1 is: n0 = 2000, 0 = 0.75, rs = 0.18, rb = 0.19, w = 100, v = 46, α = 0.1,
while that used for Table 2 is: n0 = 2000, 0 = 0.5, rs = 0.17, rb = 0.19, w = 100, v =
40, α = 0.1. For both these tables risky expected rate of returns r¯r is smaller than
rb and the dynamics converges either to ‘all risky’ agents configuration or to a mixed
ESS. In Table 3, the risky expected rate of returns r¯r = .1250 which is greater than rb
and rs, thus the dynamics converges to all risky-agents, as indicated by Corollary 1.
u d δ φ1 φ2 
∗
0.2 -0.05 0.8 72 0 1
0.2 -0.1 0.8 72 0 1
0.2 -0.15 0.8 72 0 1
0.2 -0.2 0.8 72 0 1
0.2 -0.25 0.8 72 0 1
Table 1. When the shocks are too large
along with larger taxes (v = 46), the aver-
age dynamics converges to a configuration
with all ‘risk-free agents’ !
u d δ φ1 φ2 
∗
0.2 -0.1 0.95 78.33 78.27 0.3326
0.2 -0.11 0.95 78.24 78.31 0.3791
0.2 -0.12 0.95 78.14 78.14 0.4288
0.2 -0.13 0.95 78.04 78.04 0.4820
0.2 -0.14 0.95 77.92 77.92 0.5385
Table 2. Average dynamics converges to
mixed ESS, at which both populations sur-
vive with φ1 = φ2,
u d δ φ1 φ2 
∗
0.15 -0.1 0.9 0 82.12 0
0.16 -0.1 0.9 0 83.24 0
0.17 -0.1 0.9 0 84.29 0
0.18 -0.1 0.9 0 85.19 0
Table 3. Average Dynamics
converges to all ‘risky-agents’;
Configuration: n0 = 2000, 0 =
.5, rs = 0.10, rb = 0.12, w =
100, v = 30, α = 0.5
Config ∗(Theory) ?(Monte Carlo)
(d, δ, v) Avg Rndm Avg Rndm
0.10, 0.95, 40 0 0 .0016 0.0011
-0.10, 0.95, 40 0.33 0 .3214 0.0004
-0.15, 0.95, 40 0.6 0 .5988 0.0014
0.10, 0.80, 46 1 0 .9896 0.0065
Table 4. Average and Random dynamics,
Comparison of MC results with theory Con-
figuration: n0 = 2000, u = 0.2, rs = 0.17, rb =
0.19, w = 100, α = 0.1
In Table 4 we considered random dynamics as well as average dynamics. In addi-
tion, we provided the Monte-Carlo based estimates. There is a good match between the
MC estimates and the theory. Further we have the following observations: a) random
dynamics always converge to a configuration with all ‘risky’ agents, as given by Corol-
lary 2; b) when r¯r > rb, the average dynamics also converges to 
∗ = 0 as suggested
by Corollary 1; and c) when r¯r < rb, the average dynamics converges to mixed ESS or
to a configuration with all ‘risk-free’ agents, again as given by Corollary 1.
As the ‘risk increases’, i.e., as the amount of taxes increase and or as the expected
rate of return of risky investments r¯r decreases, one can observe that the average
dynamics converges to all ‘risk-free’ agents (last row of Table 4) thus averting systemic
risk event (when there are large number of defaults, Pd). While the random dynamics
fails to do the same. As predicted by theory (the configurations satisfying part (b) of
Corollary 2), random dynamics might also succeed in averting the systemic risk event,
when the expected number of defaults is one for all  > 0. It is trivial to verify that
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the configuration with w(1 + u) < v, is one such example. Thus, average dynamics is
much more robust towards averting systemic risk events.
6 Conclusions
We consider a financial network with a large number of agents. The agents are inter-
connected via liability graphs. There are two types of agents, one group lends to others
and invests the rest in risk-free projects, while the second group borrows/lends and
invests the rest in risky ventures. Our study is focused on analysing the emergence of
these groups, when the new agents adapt their strategies for the next investment round
based on the returns of the previous round. We considered two types of dynamics; in
average dynamics the new agents observe large sample of data before deciding their
strategy, and in random dynamics the decision is based on a small random sample.
We have the following important observations: a) when the expected rate of return
of the risky investments is higher (either when the shocks are rare or when the shocks
are not too large) than the risk-free rate, then ‘risk-free’ group wipes out eventually,
almost all agents go for risky ventures; this is true for both types of dynamics; b) when
the expected rate of risky investments is smaller, a mixed ESS can emerge with average
dynamics while the random dynamics always converges to all risky agents; at mixed
ESS the expected returns of both the groups are equal; more interestingly, when the
risky-expected rate is too small, the average dynamics converges to a configuration
with all risk-free agents.
In other words, in scenarios with possibility of a systemic risk event, i.e., when
there is a possibility of the complete-system collapse (all agents default), the average
dynamics manages to wipe out completely the risky agents; the random dynamics
can fail to do the same. Thus when agents make their choices rationally and after
observing sufficient sample of the returns of the previous round of investments, there
is a possibility to avoid systemic risk events. These are some initial results and we
would like to investigate further in future to make more affirmative statements in this
direction.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : We consider the following:
Case 1: First consider the case when downward shock can be absorbed , in this case
the clearing vector x¯∞ = yδ + y(1− δ) = y, default probability is Pd = 0. The region
is true if the following condition is meet i.e., if
Kd − v + yc > y =⇒ c > y − w
y
Case 2: Consider the case with banks receive shock will default and the corresponding
average clearing vector x¯∞ = yδ + (w + cx¯∞)(1− δ) which simplifies to :
x¯∞ =
yδ + w(1− δ)
1− c(1− δ).
This region lasts if the following conditions hold to be true
Kd − v + cx¯∞ < y, and Ku − v + cx¯2∞ > y.
Substituting x¯∞ = yδ+w(1−δ)
1−c(1−δ) we have,
y − w
y − (1− δ)(w − w) < c <
y − w
y
.
Case 3: In this we first calculate x¯∞ which is obtained by solving following fixed
point equation:
x¯∞ = (Kd − v + cx¯∞)(1− δ) + (Ku − v + cx¯∞)δ =⇒ x¯∞ = EW
1− c .
In this case the default probability is Pd = 1. The regime satisfies if the following hold
Ku − v + c EW
1− c < y =⇒ c <
y − w
y − (1− δ)(w − w) . 
Proof of Corollary 1: First consider the system with δ = 1, i.e., system without
shocks. From Lemma 1, PD ≤ (1− δ) for all  because (with δ = 1)
y
(
c − y − w¯
y
)
= w(1+)(1+u)−v−w(1+rb) = w(1+u)−v+w(u−rb) ≥ w(1+u)−v,
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for all  (the lower bound independent of ). Under these assumptions, there exists
δ¯ < 1 by continuity of the involved functions such that
y
(
c − y − w¯
y − (1− δ)(w¯ − w)
)
> 0 for all δ ≥ δ¯ and for all .
Thus from Lemma 1 x¯∞ = y or x¯∞ = δy+(1−δ)w
1−(1−δ)c for all such δ ≥ δ¯. We would repeat a
similar trick again, so assume initially x¯∞ = y for all  and consider δ ≥ δ¯. With this
assumption we will have:
R1() =
(
w(1 + rs) +
(1− α)(1− )
(α+ )
y − v
)+
(20)
= (w(1 + rs) + w(1− )(1 + rb)− v)+
= (w(1 + rb)− v + w(rs − rb)) , under the given hypothesis, and
R2() =
(
Ki +
α(1 + )
α+ 
y − v − y
)+
= (Ki − w(1 + rb)− v)+ (21)
=
{
R2u w.p. δ where R
2
u := w(1 + u)− v + w(u− rb)(
R2d
)+
w.p. 1− δ where R2d := w(1 + d)− v + w(d− rb).
Note that R2u ≥ w(1 + u)− v > 0 (for any ) under the given hypothesis.
Proof of part (a): When r¯r > rb, from (13), it is clear that (inequality only when R
2
d
is negative)
φ2()− φ1() ≥ R2uδ +R2d(1− δ)− φ1() = w(r¯r − rb) + w(r¯r − rs) > 0.
Thus in this case φ2 > φ1 for all  and hence
g() < 1/2 and 2g()− 1 < 0 for all 0 <  < 1.
Therefore with Lyaponuv function V0() = /(1−) on defined on neighbourhood [0, 1)
of 0 (in relative topology on [0, 1]) we observe that
dV0
d
h() =

1−  (2g()− 1) < 0 for all 0 <  < 1 and equals 0 for  = 0.
Further V0() → ∞ as  → 1, the boundary point of [0, 1). Thus ∗ = 0 is the asymp-
totically stable attractor of ODE (16) (see [11, Appendix, pp.148]) and hence the result
follows by Theorem 2.
For all δ ≥ δ¯, from Lemma 1, we have the following
sup

|y − x¯∞| = sup

(1− δ)
∣∣∣∣ y − c − w1− (1− δ)c
∣∣∣∣ < 1− δδ η (22)
for some η > 0 , which decreases to 0 as δ → 1. ( The last inequality is due to c < 1 and
then taking supremum over ). By continuity of the above upper bound with respect
to δ and the subsequent functions considered in the above parts of the proof, there
exists a δ¯ < 1 (further big if required) such that all the above arguments are true for
all δ > δ¯.
Proof of part (b): The proof follows in similar way, now using Lyaponuv function
V1() = (1− )/ on neighbourhood (0, 1] of 1, and by observing that g() > 1/2 for all
 < 1 and hence
dV1
d
h() = −1− 

(2g()− 1) < 0 for all 0 <  < 1 and equals 0 for  = 1.
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Proof of part (c): It is clear that φ1() = R
1() decreases linearly as  increases:
φ1() = w(1 + rb)− v + w(rs − rb).
For  in the neighbourhood of 0, φ2() > 0 and is decreasing linearly with slope
r¯r − rb, because R2d(0) = w(1 + d)− v > 0 and thus for such 
φ2() = w(1 + r¯r)− v + w(r¯r − rb).
From (21), R2d() is decreasing with increase in . There is a possibility of an ¯ that
satisfies R2d(¯) = 0, in which case φ2 increases linearly with slope δw(u− rb), i.e.,
φ2() = δ [w(1 + u)− v + w(u− rb)] for all  ≥ ¯.
When r¯r < rb we have, φ1(0) = w(1 + rb)− v > w(1 + r¯r)− v = φ2(0).
By hypothesis φ1() < φ2() for some , hence by intermediate value theorem there
exists at least one ∗ that satisfies φ1(∗) = φ2(∗). Further the zero is unique because
φ2 is either linear or piece-wise linear (with different slops), while φ1 is linear.
Consider Lyaponuv function V∗() := ( − ∗)2/((1 − )) on neighbourhood (0, 1)
of ∗, note V∗() → ∞ as  → 0 or  → 1 and observe by (piecewise) linearity of the
functions we will have
φ1() > φ2() and thus (2g()− 1) > 0 for all 0 <  < ∗ and
φ2() > φ1() and thus (2g()− 1) < 0 for all 1 >  > ∗.
Thus we have9, dV∗
d
= 2
− ∗
(1− ) +
(− ∗)2(2− 1)
2(1− )2 and hence
dV∗
d
h() = (− ∗)
(
2 +
(− ∗)(2− 1)
(1− )
)
(2g()− 1) < 0 for all  /∈ {0, 1, ∗}.
Thus ∗ is the asymptotically stable attractor of ODE (16) and hence the result follows
by Theorem 2. The result can be extended for δ < 1 as in case (a) and the rest of the
details follow by direct verification (at δ = 1), i.e., by showing that φ1(
∗) = φ2(∗) at
δ = 1 and the equality is satisfied approximately in the neighbourhood of δ = 1. 
Proof of Corollary 2: For part (a), hR() = −cG(1 − ), where the constant
cG = 1 (or respectively cG = 2δ−1). Using Lyanponuv function of part (a) of Corollary
1, the proof follows in exactly the same lines.
For part (b), hR() = (1− ), and proof follows as in part (b) of Corollary 1. For part
(c), first observe (using equations (20)-(21) of proof of Corollary 1)
R2u()−R1() ≥ w(1 + u) + w(u− rs)− y + x¯∞
(
2α+ − 1
α+ 
)
= w(1 + u) + w(u− rs) + (x¯∞ − y)− x¯∞
(
1− α
α+ 
)
= w(u− rb) + w(u− rs) + (x¯∞ − y)
(
1− 1− α
α+ 
)
> 0.
9 When  < 1/2 and  < ∗ then clearly (−
∗)(2−1)
(1−) > 0. When  > 1/2 we have
(2− 1)/ < 1/2 and with  < ∗ we have ∗ −  < 1−  and thus
2 +
(− ∗)(2− 1)
(1− ) ≥ 3/2 > 0 for all  < 
∗.
In a similar way  > ∗, then we will have that the above term is again positive.
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The last inequality is trivially true for δ = 1 (and so x¯∞ = y) for the given hypothesis,
and then by continuity as in proof of Corollary 1, one can consider δ¯ < 1 such that for
all δ ≥ δ¯, the term (x¯∞−y)(1− 1−α
α+
)
(uniformly over ) can be made arbitrarily small.
When Pd = 0, i.e., x¯
∞ = y for some , then R2d()−R1() = w(d− rb) +w(d− rs) < 0
for all such . When Pd 6= 0, then R2d = 0 ≤ R1. Thus in either case R2d() ≤ R1() for
all .
By virtue of the above arguments we have PD ≤ (1− δ) and E[G] = 1− δ and this
is true for all , for all δ ≥ δ¯. The rest of the proof follows from part(a). 
